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Semantic Reversal: Individual, Person, Individualism, 
INDIVIDUALIZATION, and Subject of Fundamental 
Rights 
Brunela Vieira De Vincenzi1 
ABSTRACT 
Based upon the theory of justice, founded on reciprocal and co-
operative recognition, this study seeks to demonstrate that there are 
alternative means of dispute resolution within the spheres of family 
and work, which produce binding decisions that are accepted by the 
parties to the conflict as fair.  At the same time, it also seeks to 
demonstrate that certain conflicts cannot be withdrawn from the pur-
view and judgment of the State Judiciary System, with the goal of 
reestablishing the confidence that individuals have in the decision-




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. Introduction: Clarifications and the Chosen Example ................... 69	
II. Semantic Reversal: Individual and Person ................................... 71	
III. Paradoxes of Individualization: Individualism, 
Individualization, and Subject of rights .................................. 82	
 
 
 1. Doctor in Civil Law, Constitutional Law, and Legal Philosophy by the Johann Wolf-
gang Goethe Universität – Frankfurt am Main. Master in Procedural Law by the Uni-
versity of São Paulo (Brazil).  Graduated in Law at the Federal University of Espírito 
Santo (Brazil).  Postdoctoral training at the Center for Violence Studies, University of 
São Paulo and the Institut für Sozialforschung in Frankfurt am Main, Germany.  Ref-
eree of the Journal of Constitutional Theory Hermeneutics and Law Studies.  Professor 
at the Graduation and Post-Graduation Law Courses of the Federal University of Es-
pírito Santo (Brazil).  Coordinator of the International Advocacy Training Group and 
of the Centre for Legal Practice at the Federal University of Espírito Santo (Brazil). 
DEVINICZI_ARTICLE 3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/8/17  12:41 PM 




I. Introduction: Clarifications and the Chosen Example  
  In 2003, the German Constitutional Court handed down a de-
cision that changed the debate on the effects of constitutional guaran-
tees on relationships between private right holders and the State, 
stimulating a democratic public debate concerning the effective exer-
cise of fundamental rights.2  The decision is about whether an Islamic 
teacher may wear her veil while teaching class.3   The teacher in 
question was born in Afghanistan and lives in Germany.4   After pass-
ing a difficult exam to begin her career as a teacher at a public 
school, she was asked to lecture at a school in the state of Baden-
Württemberg.5  Shortly thereafter, the same teacher was prohibited 
from continuing to teach if she continued to wear her veil during 
class.6  This occurred because the religious manifestation that the veil 
represented was in conflict with the secular duty of a government 
employee.7   The German Constitutional Court found, in this case, 
that the State Legislature, which would have the authority to legislate 
on this matter, should resolve the problem.8  
As such, the Constitutional Court’s decision is rather significant, 
since by failing to hand down a cogent enforceable ruling—through 
an order on constitutional appeal (Verfassungsbeschwerde) with valid 
support of German Fundamental Law (Grundgesetz) – it transfers (or 
returns) authority for judgment of a constitutional issue to the Legis-
lature.9  The argument used is that a decision with such serious reper-
 
 2. Bundesverfassugsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 24, 2003, 2 
BVR 1436/02, 2003 (Ger.). 
 3. Christine Langenfeld & Sarah Mohsen, Germany: The Teacher Head Scarf Case, 3 
INT’L J. OF CONSTL. LAW, Jan. 2005, at 86. 
 4. Mark Lander, A German Court Accepts Teacher’s Head Scarf, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 
2003, (last visited Nov. 4, 2016, 4:51 PM), http://nytimes.com/2003/09/25/a-german-
court-accepts-teacher-s-headscarf.html. 
 5. Discrimination in the Name of Neutrality, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 6, 2009), 
http://www.hrw.org/report/headscarf-bans-teachers-and-civil-servants-germany (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2016). 
 6. Id. 
 7. High Court Rules Headscarves Okay for Teachers, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Sept. 24, 2003), 
http:// www.dw.com/en/high-courtrules-headscarvesokayforteachers/a-978043 (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2016). 
 8. Bundesverfassugsgericht, supra note 3, at 62.  
 9. Bundesverfassugsgericht, supra note 3, at 62. 
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cussions should not be made solely by the judiciary or by the execu-
tive, but rather by the representatives of the people employing a mod-
el of parliamentary political representation.10  
Since then, in a notably democratic country, with a Judeo-
Christian tradition of culture and philosophy, a piece of cloth has 
been causing a furor.11 In addition to the aforementioned decision, 
other legal decisions12 have caught the attention of public opinion 
concerning constitutional law, leading to a public debate on the polit-
ical-legal discourse of religious freedom and its efficacy (as a funda-
mental right) in relationships in which the parties are people made of 
flesh and blood, private right holders.13  A passage from the dissent 
offered during the handing down of the decision of the 2nd Senate of 
the Constitutional Court mentioned above, is the starting point that 
this text intends to analyze.14  The particular impact refers to the sug-
gestion made by the 2nd Senate that an individual should return to the 
site where claims for realization of their personality were appropriate, 
thus avoiding conflicts that could create obstacles to the materializa-
tion of the democratic will.15  
Thus, the question is posed: is there truly a place where an indi-
vidual can develop their personalities in the manners suggested by the 
Constitutional Court?  Moreover, if these places do exist, what should 
the self-reflection process be like for the individual in this place and 
how do they assert their freedom in society?  In the items below I will 
analyze the possibility of reflection by the individual in the societal 
environment based upon the theory of systems posed by Niklas Luh-
mann, indicating the weaknesses of this theory for the problem in 
 
 10. Bundesverfassugsgericht, supra note 3, at 62. 
 11. Discrimination in the Name of Neutrality, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 6, 2009), 
http://www.hrw.org/report/headscarf-bans-teachers-and-civil-servants-germany (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2016). 
 12. Discrimination in the  Name of Neutrality, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb 2009), 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/germany0209_webcover.pdf; Monica-
Elena Herghelegiu, Germany’s Encounter With Islam - Legal and Theological Issues, 
22 ISTANBUL UNIVERSITESI İLAHIYAT FAKU ̈LTESI DERGISI  51, 67 (2010), 
http://www.journals.istanbul.edu.tr/iuilah/article/viewFile/1023014567/1023013781; 
Bundesverfassugsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 30, 2003, 2 
BVR 792/03, (1-27) 2003 (Ger.). 
 13. Axel Frhr. Campenhausen, The German Headscarf Debate, 2004 BYU L. REV. 665, 
666 (May 1, 2004), http: //digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2004/iss2/11. 
 14. Bundesverfassugsgericht, supra note 3, at 75-138. 
 15. Bundesverfassugsgericht, supra note 3, at 79. 
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question, and will thus reach a diagnosis and proposal of solutions 
based upon Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition.16 
 
II. Semantic Reversal: Individual and Person 
The individual, as an autonomous Psychological System (or 
Bewustseinssytem), is part of the environment of society, and when 
an individual acts in society, he or she uses the mask of a person, as-
suming various roles from that point on (teacher, jurist, economist, 
doctor, etc.).17  That means that the realization of the personality 
takes place when the individual has their own space to freely develop 
their thoughts, and this takes place in the societal environment.18 As 
such, it is decisive that the point of reference for the reflection passes 
from identity to difference;19 which is to say, that the reflection pre-
supposes the existence of systems that allow for self-observation and 
describe the difference between the system and the environment, so 
that social-structural and semantic individualization of this self-
description takes place in the form of a pretension.20 The individual 
emerges in society when they act, communicate, develop, and culti-
vate relationships with people in different social systems.21  
 
 16. NIKLAS LUHMANN, INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEMS THEORY, (Peter Gilgen trans., Polity 
Press 2013 Eng. ed. 2013) (2002); AXEL HONNETH, THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION: 
THE MORAL GRAMMAR OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS (Joel Anderson trans., The MIT Press, 
1996) (1995). 
 17. HANS RHEINFELDER, DAS WORT PERSONA [THE WORD PERSON] reprinted in BEIHEFTE 
ZUR ZEITSCHRIFT FUR ROMANISCHE PHILOLOGIE, Vol. 77 (Halle: H. Neimeyer, 1928); 
HISTORISCHES WORTERBUCH DER PHILOPSOPHIE [HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF 
PHILOSOPHY] 269-338 (Joachim Ritter & Karlfried Gunder eds., Basel 1976). 
 18. Tina Bering Keiding, Observing Participating Observation-A Re-description Based on 
Systems Theory, F.: QUALITATIVE SOC. RES. (2010) Vol. 11, No. 3, Art. 11, Ch. 2.1, 
http://www.qualitative-research.net. 
 19. Id. 
 20. NIKLAS LUHMANN, DIE GESELLSCHAFTLICHE DIFFERENZIERUNG UND DAS INDIVIDUUM 
[THE DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL], in 6 SOZIOLOGISCHE 
AUFKLÄRUNG [ in 6 SOCIAL CLARIFICATIONS] 121, 129 (2d ed. Wiesbaden 2005). 
 21. NIKLAS LUHMANN, DIE FORM PERSON [THE FORM PERSON], in 6 SOZIOLOGISCHE 
AUFKLÄRUNG [ in 6 SOCIAL CLARIFICATIONS] 137 (2d ed. Wiesbaden 2005); Gunter 
Teubner, Die Anonyme Matrix: Zu Menschenrechtsyerletzungen durch ‘Private’ 
Transnationale Akteure [The Anonymous Matrix: Human Rights Violations by ‘Pri-
vate’ Transnational Actors], 69 MOD. L. REV. 327, (2006) 
https://ssm.com/abstract=893106. 
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However, it is only through the claim that the difference built in-
to the system is the difference between the system and the environ-
ment that an individual has the possibility of creating an autonomous 
identify for him or herself.22  What individuals receive in feedback, as 
an individual in social systems is not what constitutes their identity;23 
rather it is much more of a confirmation, refusal, or indifference with 
respect to their pretension.  
The pretension of being an individual is not just that of differen-
tia individualis intellectually, much less the determination of the no-
tion of individual from human being as the difference in relation to 
all the rest.24  It is the pretention to have pretensions; it is the preten-
sion of a principle generator through which one desires to conquer in-
formation, test the world, and at the same time, self-define.25  
With the growing complexity of social rationalities, different in-
dividual pretensions collide with one another as well as with the ra-
tionalities of social systems.26  These collisions are not just conse-
quences of liberal and economic globalization, but also an expression 
of much deeper social contradictions in sectors of global society that 
collide with one another.27  
However, one cannot fail to consider that it is specifically 
through these collisions (or struggles) that individuals collect their 
individual experiences that will help towards their later self-
reflection.28 Finally, the same process that is started based upon these 
collisions generates the rules for the resolution of these collisions.  
The experience either in the form of suffering, pain, or learning are 
acquired through these collisions and are important towards the de-
velopment of an individual identity for each psychological system, 
and the structural regulation is relevant to social sub-systems.29  
Society as a whole, represented by social systems, is contingent 
for the individuals, since its complexity “is merely the information 
 
 22. LUHMANN, supra note 24. 
 23. LUHMANN, supra note 24. 
 24. LUHMANN, supra note 24. 
 25. LUHMANN, supra note 23, at 129. 
 26. LUHMANN, supra note 23, at 129. 
 27. Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Fragmentierung des Weltrechtes: Ver-
netzung globaler Regimes statt statistischer Rechtseinheit [Fragmentation of Global 
Law: Connection of Global Regimes Instead of a Unified Legal System] 4 (2007). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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concerning the fact that the individual is lacking the information 
needed to understand everything.”30  As such, rules that arise in this 
collision process will not be used and will not necessarily regulate a 
conflict-based legal relationship, but it will certainly allow rules cre-
ated within the law (general clauses and fundamental rights) to be 
configured internally by the individuals themselves.31 For this reason, 
it is impossible to want these rules to be in a hierarchy within the le-
gal system through a simple comparison of values or weighing there-
of.32  They create mere normative compatibility, since they are indi-
vidual rules.33  Individual rules will only influence the law when they 
consciously reach the halls of justice; and initially they will be simple 
“instruments of collision management”34 that try to minimize the 
damages caused during struggles and conflicts among individuals.  
On this point, considering the fact that the society in which we 
live is highly differentiated and complex, it is important to analyze 
how individuals understand themselves and how they are understood 
in different social systems.35 This is because people in current society 
no longer see themselves strongly connected to classes or families36 
and they may move flexibly among different systems. In our reflex-
ive modern society, they have to conquer access to all functional so-
cial systems, in order to live as they see fit.37  Individuals, psycholog-
ical systems in the theory of systems, should try, through their 
inclusion in society, to be accepted as people within society. And this 
has to happen through the exercise of social norms such as freedom 
and equality, which are not determined by people, but symbolize 
much more: it is every person’s responsibility person to make these 
norms effective (for themselves).38  
Therefore, although no regulation is developed for functional so-
cial systems, allowing symbiosis with its environment, the individual 
gains in experience, and thus, finds himself in a process of dynamic 
 
 30. LUHMANN, supra note 23, at 131. 
 31. LUHMANN, supra note 23, at 131. 
 32. LUHMANN, supra note 23, at 131. 
 33. LUHMANN, supra note 23, at 131. 
 34. FISCHER-LESCANO & TEUBNER, supra note 30, at 23. 
 35. FISCHER-LESCANO & TEUBNER, supra note 30, at 23. 
 36. See ULRICH BECK, RISIKOGESELLSCHAFT: AUF DEM WEG IN EINE ANDERE MODERNE 
[SOCIETY OF RISK: THE PATH TOWARDS ANOTHER MODERNITY] (1986). 
 37. LUHMANN, supra note 23, at 131. 
 38. LUHMANN, supra note 23, at 131. 
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learning for their own self-reference.39  This can also take place, in 
the words of the theory of systems, through the re-entry of the form 
person in the consciousness of the individual:40  
“It [a re-entry] allows the re-entry of one form into the form, 
therefore a difference in distinction; in the case of systems (and we 
are dealing with psychological systems), the re-entry of the difference 
from the environment in the system.”41 
 
Please note that in this systematic view of society, everything is 
seen as self-reference: the system works as a closed operational sys-
tem.42 It can only be transformed by itself.43 Thought itself alters 
nothing in the environment.44 Only the environment can change it-
self.45 Based upon this theoretical premise, the form person in and of 
itself is not a system, “the person is the designation of the logical lo-
cation in which a social system creates ‘character masks,’ which refer 
to human and non-human processes in the environment [of socie-
ty].”46  The person, as they arise within the social system, is the most 
important instrument for communication between society and its en-
vironment.47  Thus, for the theory of the systems, people “serve as 
points of reference within the social system and at the same time as 
definers of limits” between society and its environment.48 
In the opinion of Niklas Luhmann, structural couplings 
(strukturelle Kopplugen) ensure the co-evolution of systems and their 
environment.49  A closed operational self-production system is inca-
pable of affecting the environment with its own operations, since the 
 
 39. LUHMANN, supra note 23, at 131. 
 40. LUHMANN, supra note 23, at 131. 
 41. LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 138. 
 42. LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 138. 
 43. LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 138. 
 44. LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 138. 
 45. LUHMANN, supra note 24, at 139. 
 46. Gunther Teubner, Elektronische Agenten und große Menschenaffen: Zur Ausweitung 
des Akteurstatus in Recht und Politik [Electronic Agents and Large Anthropomorphs: 
Towards the Expansion of the Agent’s Condition] 1, 15 (2006).  
 47. Id. 
 48. Gunther Teubner, Rights of Non-humans? Electronic Agents and Animals as New Ac-
tors in Politics and Law, 33 J.L. SOC’Y 497, 514 (2006). 
 49. Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search 
for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999, 1013 
(2003-2004).  
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operations always remain within the limits (or: the form) of the sys-
tem.50  The system cannot operate in its environment, and thus, it 
cannot use its own operation to test the environment’s resistance.51  
Here the connection between the individual and social systems be-
comes clear in its importance towards social development (of func-
tional systems) through potential structural coupling.52  Niklas Luh-
mann’s theory, however, does not provide sufficient responses 
concerning the relationship between the individual and their person 
form or between the systems and the information that people accumu-
late through communicative actions within society; much less does it 
accept the existence of a connection between the individual and the 
system.53  
In short, what I have tried to explain so far is that the place for an 
individual’s self-reflection is the societal environment.  However, fol-
lowing the entire theoretical framework of the theory of systems, it is 
not possible to understand which perceptions the individual obtains 
based upon acting as a person in social systems, and how this move-
ment can contribute towards their process of self-reflection in the so-
cietal environment.  
In order to contradict the understanding of the theory of systems, 
it is important to consider that for Jürgen Habermas, the human does 
not enter society as a mere organism (as a part that is osmotically dif-
ferent from the foreign exterior world).54  For Habermas, the abstrac-
tion that intends to place subject and object face-to-face, internal and 
external, is an illusion, since a baby who has just been born only be-
comes a human being once it commences social interaction.55  It be-
comes a human being when it enters the public sphere, the social 
world that is awaiting it with open arms.56  Moreover, this opening of 
 
 50. Clemens Matthheis, The System Theory of Niklas Luhmann and the Constitutionaliza-
tion of the World Society, 4 GOJIL 625, 629-30 (2012).  
 51. Luhmann, Probleme mit operativer Schließung, Soziologische Aufklärung [Problems 
with Operational Closure, Social Clarifications], 6 2d. WIESBADEN 17 (2005). 
 52. Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, supra note 52, at 1013.  
 53. LUHMANN, supra note, 24 at 145. 
 54. Jürgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays, 14 
(CIARAN CRONIN TRANS., POLITY PRESS ED., 2008).  
 55. Id. at 171. 
 56. Id.  
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the inhabited interior of our way of living is the same from an inter-
nal and external point of view.57  
On this point, it could be said that there is a similarity between 
the person form of Niklas Luhmann and the individual in the Haber-
mas theory, since for both theories (that of systems and that of com-
municative reason), the premise prevails that the person is the indi-
vidual in communication within society.58  The important difference 
for the theme covered herein, resides in the fact that for Habermas, 
the individual at the time of social communication may no longer re-
turn to the societal environment, since now they are already social-
ized.59  The person is the one who expresses to the other in social 
communication.60    
Thus, the person in a growth phase can only constitute what they 
express in social communication.  The apparent particular conscious-
ness, even if based upon manifestations of personal and intimate 
emotional perceptions of the flows of impacts absorbed from cultural 
networks of shared public thoughts in the form of symbolic and inter-
subjective expression.61  Once an individual has entered society, they 
can no longer return to the environment, they become a person in so-
ciety: from this person others expect an opinion, an action, skills, 
etc.,62 the person acquires their identity in their discourse with the 
other:63  
 
 57. Jürgen Habermas, Öffentlicher Raum und politische Öffentlichkeit-
Lebensgeschichtliche Wurzeln von zwei Gedankenmotiven [Public Space and the Polit-
ical Public – Roots of a History of Life and Two Impacts] in Habermas, Zwischen 
Naturalismus und Religion [Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion], 
FRANKFURT AM MAIN 18 (2005). 
 58. Precisely, it should have been stated that the key characteristic of a person is their re-
sponsibility or attribution of responsibility, which is to say, the capacity for self-
criticism and self-correction that makes it possible for a subject to be held responsible 
for their statements and acts before others. Klaus Günther, Welchen Personenbegriff 
braucht die Diskurstheorie des Rechts? [What Concept of the Person Does the Law 
Require?] in Brukhorst, Das Recht der Republik [The Right of the Republic], 
FRANKFURT AM MAIN 84 (1999). 
 59. For Habermas, that would be a return to the primitive state, which after a person is so-
cialized is impossible.  See generally,  Faktizität und Geltung [Facticity and Validity], 
FRANKFURT AM MAIN 120 (2005). 
 60. Id. 
 61. HABERMAS, supra note 58, at 18. 
 62. HABERMAS, supra note 58, at 18. 
 63. HABERMAS, supra note 58, at 18.  
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“Through your view, that of a second person who speaks to me 
in the first person, I become aware not just as a subject experiencing 
something, but at the same time as a conscious I.  The subjective 
views of others possess an individualizing strength.”64 
 
Even so, according to this differentiated line of reasoning, it is 
not possible to sufficiently respond to the question posed above, 
which is to say, which perceptions the individual obtains based upon 
communicative action within social systems, and how this may con-
tribute towards their process of self-reflection in a specific site, as 
suggested by the German Constitutional Court.65   
For Habermas, contrary to Luhmann, the individual is not capa-
ble of self-reflection based on the contact with the other in the socie-
tal environment, although they may verify a great deal about them-
selves based upon these contacts.66  Here we lack the possibility of 
reflecting on the social experience in and of itself, without the influ-
ence of preexisting social rules and preconceptions.67  What’s more, 
the individual lacks the opportunity to self-determine his or her own 
right in a reflection process, in the societal environment.68  
The attempt at a type of internal acknowledgment may help re-
solve the problem stated above.69  When the pretensions of an indi-
vidual are refused by society, this individual understands the refusal 
as an affront, and through this negative experience, he believes that 
social recognition has been denied.70   In Axel Honneth’s theory of 
recognition, as well as in the understanding of Habermas, the indi-
vidual depends upon intersubjective acquiescence, and when social 
confirmation does not take place, a psychic gap rises in their person-
ality.71  For Honneth, the reason for this is the human’s fundamental 
dependence on experience: in order to achieve a successful self-
 
 64. HABERMAS, supra note 58, at 19. 
 65. Gunther Teubner, Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society, 254 (De 
Gruyter ed., reprint 2011) (1987).  
 66. HABERMAS, supra note 57, at 178. 
 67. HABERMAS, supra note 57, at 178. 
 68. HABERMAS, supra note 57, at 178. 
 69. HABERMAS, supra note 57, at 194. 
 70. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Anerkennung sozialer Kon-
flikte [The Struggle for Recognition – The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts] 
FRANKFURT AM MAIN 220 (1994). 
 71. Id. at 39.  
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relationship, he depends upon intersubjective recognition of his ca-
pacities and achievements.72  Preceded by the fact is that the subject 
has already given himself a primary self-identification in order to re-
quire the recognition of others.73  For Honneth, the process of recog-
nition from another subject presupposes that the one who gives the 
recognition sees their recognition act as a limitation in and of itself, 
of their own self-esteem:74    
In the recognizing subject, a decentralization takes place, once 
they grant value to another subject, which is the source of legitimate 
claims and that causes an interruption of their own self–love,75 and 
this because a revocation can only take place when the subject in 
question, on the other hand, has already reached the pre-conclusion 
that he was recognized as an individual within a space-time system: 
you can only make affirmations about another person, look through 
them or ignore them, when they have previously attributed the capac-
ity for a primary identification of themselves.76 
Relevant for the understanding of what Honneth proposes, is the 
question that he himself asks when he analyzes the non-recognition, 
which is the fruit of social invisibility of the subjects.77  He asks, “to 
what fact has the subject attributed their social invisibility, when they 
feel the non-recognition?”78 Further, how can inter-subjectivity take 
place when it is not based upon pre-existing subjectivity?79  
According to Honneth, from the point of view of the affected in-
dividual, the criteria based upon which he certifies his visibility, fig-
uratively is the expression of certain reactions that are a signal, a 
manifestation of positive recognition.  That is why the omission of 
these forms of expression is proof for others in this special social sig-
 
 72. Id. at 97.  
 73. AXEL HONNETH, UNSICHTBARKEIT ÜBER DIE MORALISCHE EPISTEMOLOGIE VON 
ANERKENNUNG [INVISIBILITY – CONCERNING THE MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY OF 
RECOGNITION]  (2003) reprinted in STATIONEN EINER THEOIE DER 
INTERSUBJECKTIVITÄT 13 (Frankfurt am Main, 2003). 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 22. 
 76. Id. at 13. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 14. 
 79. CHALRES LARMORE, PERSON UND ANERKENNUNG [PERSON AND RECOGNITION] 459-60 
(1998). 
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nificance we are not visible.80  The response provokes an additional 
question concerning the impact of this experience: how does the indi-
vidual internalize and reflect on this moment through which they 
comprehend or feel their lack of recognition?81  Notably, for Hon-
neth, the recognition of the human being as a person in society is 
more important than the recognition of the individual in their auton-
omous psychological system outside of society.82  The existential 
mode he analyzes also only takes place when the individual has al-
ready been introduced into family life or society.83  
 For Robert Spaemann, the solution to this problem could be a 
change in perspective, in order to not consider recognition as a mere 
distinction in the social relationship, but as the admission of the other 
into the moral world.84  Recognition as the introduction of the indi-
vidual, as a person, into the world would correspond to their exclu-
sion as an individual within society.85  In this context, it can be taken 
back only and with the sole goal of understanding the movement of 
an individual’s self-reflection and the place of this reflection, Luh-
mann’s distinction: society, environment and individual self-
reflection.86 
However, the point is not as simple at all that.  Since, in addition 
to non-recognition, the lack of self-reflection imposed by social sys-
tems causes individuals to become alienated from themselves,87 since 
they commence permanent use of social masks.  Thus, instead of 
considering the person as a conscious member of society, we may 
consider them as a cooperative being or member of a society.88  
 
 80. HONNETH, supra note76, at 14. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. AXEL HONNETH, VERDINGLICHUNG [REIFICATION] 60 n.19 (2005).  
 84. LARMORE, supra note 82, at 464; ROBERT SPAEMANN, PERSONEN. VERSUCHE ÜBER DE 
UNTERSCHIED ZWISCHEN “ETWAS” AND”JEMAND” [PEOPLE. ATTEMPT AT THE 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOMETHING AND SOMEONE] (2d ed. 1998).  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. 
 87. RAHEL JÄGGI, ENTFREMDUNG (Frankfurt am Main 2005) originally GEORG LUKÁCS, 
GESCHICHTE UND KLASSENBEWUSSTSEIN [HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS] (Neu-
wied/Berlin 1968); MARTN MORLOK, SELBSTVERTÄNDNIS ALS RECHTSKRITERIUM 28 
(Tubingen 1993) (alienation in the relationship between the system of law and its envi-
ronment).   
 88. Thorsten Jantschek, Von Personen und Menschen [On People and Human Beings] 46 
DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE 465, 468 (1998).  
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Nevertheless, the fear of return of the metaphysical concept of a 
person by current social theories inhibits the observation of an acute 
and current problem:89 the manipulation of the social role of the indi-
vidual by the media, by the economy, by the educational system, and 
by the environmental protection movement, among others.90  It is im-
posed upon the individual through this conscious and unconscious 
manipulation, how and in what manner he should be and how he 
should present himself.91    
Society starts to be understood as a large pluralist stage, wherein 
the directors – the economy, media, law, sports and social move-
ments – distribute scripts: “The show is not a set of images, but rather 
a social relationship among people generated by these images.”92  
This is why it is important to recognize that individuals should be 
granted the possibility of self-reflection concerning the use of social 
masks and concerning their acting out of social roles.   Self-
reflection, as a process of self-affirmation, could then be a solution 
for the problem, to the extent that it constitutes the individuals rela-
tionship with oneself, to thus register within a certain mental occur-
rence. “93 Please note that this relationship is not some type of dis-
covery or an “act of recognition “94 of the internal conscience, rather 
it is a reflection concerning the experiences held by each individual 
in society.95     In fact, for Honneth, it is much more a type of Expres-
sionism:96  
“We do not distinguish our mental conditions as mere objects, 
nor do we constitute them through a declaration, but we articulate 
them in accordance with what is intimately familiar to us.”97 
The internal reflection of each individual is the site of his or her 
original freedom.98 Their vision of the world or his or her own reli-
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. GUY DEBORD, DI GESELLESCHAFT DES SPEKTAKELS [THE SOCIETY OF THE SPECTACLE] 
14 (1996). 
 93. HONNETH, supra note 86, at 82. 
 94. Id. at 85.  
 95. Id. 
 96. DAVID H. FINKELSTEIN, EXPRESSION AND THE INNER 9-27 (2003) (Discusses Honneth’s 
conclusions on expressionism).  
 97. HONNETH, supra note 86, at 88. 
 98. HONNETH, supra note 86, at 88. 
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gion is reflected, is the place that should be protected by law.99  The 
direct efficacy of fundamental rights allows each individual, as a per-
son in society, to assert their rights, not just as a means of discourse 
of formal equality, but also as the solidification of their recently de-
fined pretensions.100  The theory defended herein accepts the meta-
phor of the theory of systems for the psychological system, but builds 
upon it and considers each individual as a subject capable of self-
reflection in the societal environment, where there is the possibility 
of completing their own rights and defining their legal pretensions to 
be exercised within society.101   
This theory should not be confused with the debate about com-
munities and liberalism in political philosophy.102  It is much more an 
attempt to justify the need for permanent self-reflection within the 
societal environment.  The consequence is not a transformation of the 
citizen into an egotistical and alienated person,103 but rather the pos-
sibility of exercising fundamental rights by all individuals, independ-
ent of the fact of whether they are part of the policy, economy, 
school, healthcare system, or religion.104  This possibility, as stated 
previously, is based upon the premise that they have reflected as in-
dividuals outside of society based upon the parameters of their liber-
ty, conscience or creed, and principally, that all of them have had 
equal chances to freely exercise this reflection.105  
Based upon this new perspective, the crossroads resulting from 
the exercise of the right of religious freedom gains new contours, 
since the use of the fundamental freedom of religion makes it possi-
ble that the right to self-determination by the subject be inserted into 
the legal process.  The subject of rights exposes to the Judiciary the 
result of their self-reflection, through witnesses, documents, or peti-
tions.  Once this is guaranteed, the law recognizes the individual’s 
 
 99. HONNETH, supra note 86, at 88. 
 100. HONNETH, supra note 86, at 48. 
 101. HONNETH, supra note 86, at 49-50. 
 102. Cf., RAINER FORST, Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit. Politische Philosophie jenseits von 
Liberalismus und Kommunitarismus [Context of Justice. Political philosophy beyond 
liberalism and communitarianism] (1996) (debate between communitarianism and lib-
eralism). 
 103. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, Vorpolitische Grundlagen des Demokratischen Rechtsstaates? 
[Pre-Political Foundations for the Democratic State of Law?] 112 (2005). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
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pretension as just and valid, which is to say, that it will be taken into 
consideration when reasoning a decision.  The individual reflection 
then becomes an integral part of the judicial order.  The psychologi-
cal and pedagogical effect of this recognition, even for others subject 
to law, generated by communication of the State’s decision, should 
not be underestimated.106    
Contemporary society allows collisions of every kind, at any 
time, and attributes to the individual the right to insure their own 
freedom and self- realization.107  The law, responsible for attributing 
responsibilities for damages resulting from collisions does not 
acknowledge the volume of work, since conflicts grow increasingly.  
The result is that the individual, a rights holder, without the possibil-
ity of exercising those rights, drawn down by moral rules that must 
be met without reflection, or that they simply do not meet, create fi-
nancial and familial problems end up accumulating.108 
 
III. Paradoxes of Individualization: Individualism, 
Individualization, and Subject of rights 
In an article concerning paradoxes associated with individualiza-
tion, Axel Honneth established that the process of individualization is 
the “fundamental element for diagnosing modernity.”109  First, it is 
important to stress that, in his opinion, this concept is highly ambiva-
lent, since it represents on the one side an increase of characteristics 
and individual possibilities, and on the other side, it increases the 
weight of attributes imposed upon the subject.110  This means that in 
current times we are seeing a new process of individualization, dif-
ferent from those observed in earlier modernity or classic modernity, 
with the industrial revolution, which in the tradition of Durkheim 
 
 106. See, Mauro Cappelletti, Fundamental Guarantees of the Parties in Civil Proceedings, 
in FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEES IN CIVIL LITIGATION 661 (1973) (concerning the peda-
gogical function of the law, especially legal decisions). 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id.  
 109. Axel Honneth, Organisierte Selbstverwirklichung – Paradoxien der Individualisierung 
[Organized Self-Development – Paradoxes of Individualization], in BEFREIUNG DER 
MÜNDLICHKEIT – PARADOXIEN DES GEGENWÄRTIGEN KAPITALISMUS 141 (2002). 
 110. Id. at 142. 
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means autonomy and liberty.111  This new process of individualiza-
tion reflects the other side of modern life.    
Based upon the analysis of Georg Simmel, Honneth explains, 
that there is a fundamental difference between the mere increase of 
individual skills, the pluralization of lifestyles made possible by fi-
nancial economy and the increase of personal autonomy.112  It may 
even appear that with the anonymity afforded in social relations in 
large cities people no longer see themselves obliged to belong to 
groups, thus opening up the possibility of greater choices, which is 
far from meaning that individual liberty is also growing, since this 
requires the guaranteed support of other subjects.113  Honneth at this 
point refers, probably, to the need for recognition from the other, for 
the total flowering of one’s liberty in society. 
In order to better understand this question, I would like to make 
the differentiation between quantitative individualism and qualitative 
individualism made by Georg Simmel and revisited by Honneth in 
his argument concerning the paradoxes of individualization.114  Sim-
mel differentiates individualism with the terminology pair liberty-
equality in two different modes.  
In the first mode, according to the conception of the romantic 
cultural circle, he defines as the end of a goal-oriented process of de-
velopment of the internal liberty of the autonomous articulation of 
convictions and intentions, which in principle can divide all people.  
This reveals the individualism of equality, since it covers the possi-
bility of an individual’s capacity for reflection, which constitutes a 
characteristic of all humanity.115 
In the second mode, Simmel no longer refers to equality among 
individuals, but the differentiation and autonomy of the individual, 
revealing a qualitative type of individualism, the goal of which is to 
increase personal freedom, the sole characteristic of the historical de-
velopment of life as a means through which subjects differentiate 
themselves from one another.116 
 
 111. Id. at 141. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 142. 
 114. Id 
. 115. Id. at 143. 
 116. Id. 
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The differentiation between quantitative and qualitative individ-
ualism is of important relevance in Simmel’s theory, as attested in the 
works of Honneth and Markus Schroer concerning the process of in-
dividualization.117  Quantitative individualism is the individualism of 
the 18th Century, when the focus was on “freeing individuals from 
their political, religious, and economic ties, which had become un-
bearable.”118  Qualitative individualism is the individualism of the 
19th Century, which is based upon the disparity and distinction among 
individuals.119  The tendency in modernity, as Simmel is fond of em-
phasizing, is the union of these two types of individualism.120 The in-
dividuals group together through similarities of styles of life or fash-
ion, and within the groups they give up their individuality in the 
name of community, at the same time as they delineate limits around 
them in order to guarantee individuality, pushing away strangers that 
do not belong to the groups.121  
As with Honneth, Markus Schroer in his work also demonstrates 
Simmel’s ambivalence to individualism.  Especially in the analysis 
that is made on the development of large cities in his book, Philoso-
phy of Money, Simmel stresses the risks, but also the chances that a 
monetary society provides.122  Schroer explains that for Simmel, the 
Individual can only develop based upon the delimitation of a collec-
tive reference point.123  Thus, once compared with the community, 
the human learns to differentiate himself or herself as a concrete in-
dividual.  For Simmel, the individual develops their individuality 
through contact with other different people.124  Life in a society in-
tensely marked by a monetary economy can be positive for the indi-
vidual, if through autonomous relationships of economic content they 
can differentiate from the others.125  This process serves towards the 
development of the individual himself and for the definition of their 
 
 117. MARKUS SCHROER, DAS INDIVIDUUM DER GESELLSCHAFT [THE INDIVIDUAL OF 
SOCIETY] 309 (2001). 
 118. Id. at 311. 
 119. Id. at 317. 
 120. GEORG SIMMEL, PHILOSOPHIE DES GELDES,  [PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY] (Frankfurt am 
Main, 1989) 397 (1989). 
 121. SCHROER, supra note 121, at 319. 
 122. Id. at 287. 
 123. Id. at 303. 
 124. SIMMEL, supra note 124. 
 125. SIMMEL, supra note 124. 
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internal limits.126  At this point, it is important to stress that “a mone-
tary economy cannot be a guarantee of this development,”127 it is just 
the means that makes individual development possible.  The under-
standing of development of individuality itself depends upon the in-
dividual.  The monetary economy system continues to function au-
tonomously, free of the responsibility of aid by the individual to con-
construct their individuality and to differentiate from one another.  In 
this ideal circumstance, certainly it happens frequently that the indi-
viduals do not use the changes that are granted to them by systems 
for their own development.   Not because they truly do not want to, 
but because they do not know how to exist with the excess freedom 
that this represents.    
According to an analysis by Schroer of Simmel’s theory, this 
happens because individuals flee from the new freedoms con-
quered.128  The new freedom does not promise eternal pleasure; rather 
it overloads the individual who has to assume social and economic 
responsibility for his or her own well-being.   Within this context, 
Schroer explains Simmel’s ambivalence of individualism and the 
consequences for the individual: “Simmel always emphasizes the 
chances and risks that the institution of a modern monetary policy 
presents to the individual.129  In the uncertainty imposed upon the in-
dividual with the goals of traditional social relations that not only 
represent a normative stricture, rather were principally what assured 
their sustainment, he sought the inevitable consequence, the inevita-
ble burden that accompanies freedom.”130   
In this analysis, Simmel’s theory is expanded to demonstrate: 
[T]hat the pretensions of individual self-realization that in-
creased as a result of the unique and historic confluence of rather di-
vergent individualization processes that took place in Western society 
thirty, forty years ago, has over time become an institutionalized ex-
pectation of social reproduction, which lost its specific function, 
transforming into a form of legitimization within the system.”131    
 
 126. SIMMEL, supra note 124. 
 127. SCHROER, supra note 121, at 304. 
 128. Bundesverfassugsgericht, supra note 3. 
 129. SCHROER, supra note 121, at 304.  
 130. SCHROER, supra note 121, at 305. 
 131. HONNETH, supra note 112, at 146. 
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The consequence of this realization by Honneth is that the devel-
opment of distinct individualization processes today allows us to 
speak of a new type of “Individualism.”132    Irrespective of the initial 
moments of this type of development, one can state “that in just two 
decades the types of existence have individualized violently: mem-
bers of Western societies were forced, compelled or stimulated, in the 
name of future chances, to become the center of their own plans and 
modes of conducting their life.”133  This is a type of individualism is 
that in Simmel’s view, can be sought as “individualism of the qualita-
tive type.”134  Through this individualism subject live different types 
of existence, and thus, based upon the experiences may materialize at 
the core of their being, which is already a way of differentiating them 
from others.135  
Honneth proposes that the paradox of individualization in society 
can be easily observed in the fact that autonomy and independence of 
individual subjects have become a sample of the institutionalized ex-
pectation of the social system.136   Thus, it is the system itself when it 
imposes upon the subject the requirement to be authentic this over-
loads the subject. This paradoxical metamorphosis makes it so what 
was the process of personal realization through qualitative freedom, 
has become “an ideology of deinstitutionalization,”137 which leads to 
the “rise of a large number of internal symptoms of internal empti-
ness, feelings of uselessness and a lack of determination.”138  
In a subsequent text, published in conjunction with Martin Hart-
mann, Honneth resumes the analysis of individualism, making use of 
differentiation of the meaning of individualism in the “social-
democratic era” and in the “neo-liberal revolution.”139  In the social-
democratic era, the individual found a special place in the systematic 
differentiation of society.    
 
 132. HONNETH, supra note 112, at 146. 
 133. HONNETH, supra note 112, at 148. 
 134. HONNETH, supra note 112, at 150. 
 135. HONNETH, supra note 112, at 148. 
 136. HONNETH, supra note 112, at 148. 
 137. HONNETH, supra note 112, at 146. 
 138. HONNETH, supra note 112, at 146. 
 139. Martin Hartmann & Axel Honneth, Paradoxien des Kapitalismus, [Paradoxes of Capi-
talism] 13/1 CONSTELLATIONS 2, 4 (2006). 
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According to the authors, under the combined influence of the 
processes of socio-economic transformation processes and cultural 
changes during the social-democratic era in Europe and especially in 
Germany, institutionalized individualism grew in the direction of an 
idea of experimental self-realization.  The heart of which is the per-
ception of life-long learning of new existential forms, which are al-
ways considered as authentic.140  Up to that, point individualism be-
longed solely to the upper classes, but in the new and expanded ver-
version of the social-democratic era, it embraces the social majority 
of the population.141  This perception of individualism as well as the 
life expectation upon which it depended is being strongly substituted 
by the idea of “neo-liberalism,” since the start of the 1980’s.  
The dynamic of the current capitalist model contributes to the 
fact that the progress achieved during the social-democratic era is 
now being incorporated into the system.   Luc Boltanski and Ève 
Chiapello demonstrate that the capitalist system is highly flexible and 
capable of adaptation as well as to this social progress, having even, 
imperceptibly, incorporated the characteristics of social, environmen-
tal, and labor movements.142   
In this altered model of capitalism, it is expected that the indi-
vidual in their role of “labor owner”143 or a mere human resource as-
sume the responsibility for their work and quality of life.   This pecu-
liarity of individualism in late modernity removes from political and 
economic systems the responsibility they originally held towards pol-
itics and the economy themselves, and in the same fashion, leads to a 
breakdown of solidarity within human relations.144  As one can ob-
serve, in light of the pressure for greater success, the institutionalized 
models: individuals, law, labor, and love, have transformed so much, 
that they can only be understood, at this point, to be paradoxical145 
For Honneth and Hartmann the achievement of individualism 
obtained during the social-democratic era is one of the four spheres 
of normative recognition based upon the description of “Parsons’ 
 
 140. Id. E 
 141. Id. at 6. 
 142. LUC BOLTANSKI & ÈVE CHIAPELLO, DER NEUE GEIST DES KAPITALISMUS [THE NEW 
SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM] 68 (Konstanz, 2003). 
 143. HARTMANN & HONNETH, supra note 140, at 9. 
 144. HARTMANN & HONNETH, supra note 140, at 9. E 
 145. HARTMANN & HONNETH, supra note 140, at 9. 
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evolution of modern society.146  The two authors in the following 
fashion describe these four spheres: (a) the subjects are found in the 
first sphere, which may make use of the normative promises of insti-
tutionalized individualism.147  This peculiarity of individualism in 
conjunction with (b) the ideal of equality in the modern legal system, 
(c) the normative implications of the principle of productivity; and 
(d) the moral promise of a romantic deal of love,148 constitute the 
spheres of recognition that make it possible to uphold society through 
the rationale of recognition.149 
Each modality of recognition takes place in a specific societal 
sphere (or for Parsons in a social subsystem).  Love should regulate 
the inter-subjective recognition in the family sphere and within inti-
mate relations.  The law should guarantee the recognition of equality 
of subjects within inter-subjective relationships in the political model 
of the democratic state.  In addition, solidarity is the example for the 
cohesion of society as a whole.150  This text written in conjunction 
with Hartmann, includes the addition to the three spheres of recogni-
tion commonly distinguished by Honneth,151 a fourth place of recog-
nition is incorporated, called “institutionalized individualism.” 
Through which individuals may “experiment to make allusions to as-
pects of their autonomy or facets of their identity, which up until that 
point had no type of recognition in social culture.”152  
Based upon these premises, Honneth and Hartmann demonstrate 
that the “new capitalism” of late modernity is structured in a contra-
dictory fashion and transports these contradictions into non-economic 
spheres of action.153  This is where the paradoxes arise, exactly when 
the subjects in these spheres of action continue seeing themselves in 
light of the rules determined for these spheres and this at the same 
 
 146. HARTMANN & HONNETH, supra note 140, at 5. 
 147. HARTMANN & HONNETH, supra note 140, at 5. 
 148. HARTMANN & HONNETH, supra note 140, at 5. 
 149. HARTMANN & HONNETH, supra note 140, at 5.E 
 150. AXEL HONNETH, KAMPF UM ANERKENNUNG [STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION] ch. 2 
(1975). 
 151. Id. at 107. 
 152. HARTMANN & HONNETH, supra note 140, at 5 (appearing that the authors are referring 
to the possibility of inclusion into society of people belonging to groups that are histor-
ically excluded, like women, homosexuals, and in Brazil, blacks and Indians). 
 153. HARTMANN & HONNETH, supra note 140, at 5. E 
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time in which capitalism is normatively rendered flexible.154  Thus, it 
is possible to observe that previously there was clearly there was an 
increase in the spectrum of individual autonomy, and this new type of 
capitalistic organization acquires contours of an imposition, disci-
pline, or insecurity.  Worse still, in addition to the pressure exerted 
through capitalist discourse, the rationality of other social systems 
exert strong influences on individuals. 
The media, sports, and religion, among others, impose their vari-
ous rationales on individuals, who grow increasingly overloaded, and 
are unable to decide what they really want, feel to be.155  Thus, the 
individualism that during the social-democratic era meant the in-
crease of biographical liberty after the neoliberal revolution and the 
restructuring of capitalism ended up transforming into quite the op-
posite.156  It was not just individualism that moved dialectically, but 
also the rights that embody the individual’s freedom.  157 
This is the paradox where freedom is transformed into control, 
equality into inequality, freedom of the press into the manipulation of 
public opinion, etc.158 In this context, it is extremely relevant to point 
out that within the new capitalism “the frontiers between the private 
and public-professional spheres overlap.”159  
It is difficult to answer if in reality the frontiers between individ-
uals or between social communication systems will disappear and if a 
counter-process will take place in the differentiation of society.  The 
permanent irritation that the economic system exerts on its environ-
ment is however, a sign that the frontiers with the environment of the 
psychological system are overloaded.160  Alone, this overload cannot 
lead to the direct extinction of the individual (not with their imminent 
death), but rather to a mental illness, and in its extreme case, giving 
up on one’s self.161  The individual may lose their grasp on reality and 
no longer recognize which programs should be used for certain mo-
ments throughout their life.162   For example, in this process it may 
 
 154. HARTMANN & HONNETH, supra note 140, at 10. 
 155. HARTMANN & HONNETH, supra note 140, at 10. 
 156. HARTMANN & HONNETH, supra note 140, at 10. 
 157. HARTMANN & HONNETH, supra note 140, at 10. 
 158. HARTMANN & HONNETH, supra note 140, at 10.  
 159. HARTMANN & HONNETH, supra note 140, at 11. 
 160. HARTMANN & HONNETH, supra note 140, at 11. 
 161. HARTMANN & HONNETH, supra note 140, at 11. 
 162. HARTMANN & HONNETH, supra note 140, at 11. 
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happen that he is no longer able to differentiate between an intimate 
relationship and a professional relationship, and allows one, who 
holds the power, to take advantage of the inferior position that the 
other occupies in the workforce, all of which is a pathological confu-
sion.163  
Another consequence of new capitalism is the distant positioning 
of social responsibility, so that all citizens assimilate their achieve-
ments, successes, and failures totally individually, and it would be 
unthinkable to share them with the collective.164 The consequence is 
growing individual responsibility (every man for himself!), which 
consequently leads to an escape in the whole left by individualism.165   
In addition, here is where the paradox appears to lie, as Christine 
Hauskeller confirms through a brief analysis of the subject in Judith 
Butler and Foucault.166   For Hauskeller, the place of the modern sub-
ject and what that represents can only be described as a paradox.167 
Since the concrete subject, is on one hand controlled by various dis-
tinct rationales, and on the other hand, is capable of opposing these 
foreign rationales and autonomously defining how they will act indi-
vidually.168  
Alain Ehrenberg demonstrates in his work on social motivations 
of depression, that “the dichotomy of allowed – prohibited, determin-
ing through the 1950’s and 1960’s of the last century has lost its ef-
fect.”169  In current society, the notion of prohibition is relativized and 
thus is the “relationship” between the individual and society: “a per-
son is no longer moved by an external order (or to conform to a law), 
 
 163. EVA ILLOUZ, DER KONSUM DER ROMANTIK [THE CONSUMPTION OF LOVE] (Frankfurt 
am Main 2004). 
 164. HARTMANN & HONNETH, supra note 140, at 13. 
 165. HARTMANN & HONNETH, supra note 140, at 13 
 166. HARTMANN & HONNETH, supra note 140, at 13E 
 167. See generally CHRISTINE HAUSKELLER, DAS PARADOXE SUBJECKT: WIDERSTAND UND 
UNTERWERFUNG BEI JUDITH BUTLER UND MICHEL FOUCAULT [THE PARADOX 
SUBJECT: RESISTANCE AND EMERGENCY IN JUDITH BUTLER AND 
MICHEL FOUCAULT] (Tübingen 2000). 
 168. Id. at 11. 
 
169. ALAIN EHRENBERG, THE WEARINESS OF THE SELF: DIAGNOSING THE HISTORY OF 
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they have to support themselves on internal stimulus and support 
themselves on their intellectual capacity.”170  
For Ehrenberg, these changes that arose during the social-
democratic era are the social motives for the different types of de-
pression that subjects present today. In his opinion,  
Depression shows us the real experience of the person, since it is 
the illness of a society, whose rules of behavior are no longer based 
upon blame and discipline, but rather on responsibility and initiative.  
Previously, social rules demanded conformity in thought and mental 
capacities, if not behavioral automatism; today they foment initiative 
and intellectual qualifications.  Depression is more an illness of insuf-
ficiency than of improper conduct, it belongs more to the kingdom of 
dysfunction than that of the law: The depressive is a person with a 
defect.171 
A transcendental observation would allow the allocation of this 
problem and theme alongside an analysis of the law as proposed 
herein.172  The depressed individual is the consequence of the strong 
irritation that is exerted on them by social communication systems. 
What social systems expect from them – as homo economicus, homo 
juridicus, and homus tecnologicus – allows for less creativity and 
freedom than under the idea of individualism in classic modernity.  
This is caused by a dynamic that attempts to justify that the individu-
al has to be integrated and be a cog in the process of capital accumu-
lation, since “capitalism is the system that per se supports individual 
liberties and principally policies.”173   It is an “ideology that justifies 
the involvement in capitalism, making it appear that it is even some-
thing desirable.”174  This discourse and justifications, because they 
represent an ideology that has only been in place for a short time, end 
up being criticized and even denounced by the popular press.175  This 
is because the economy always needs a new format to justify the cap-
italistic spirit.  
 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 9. 
 172. Id. E  
 173. Luc Boltanski & Eve Chiapello, Die Rolle der Kritik in der Dynamik des Kapitalismus 
und der normative Wandel [The Role of Criticism in the Dynamism of Capitalism and 
Normative Change], 4 BERLINER J. FÜR SOZIOLOGIE, 459, 462 (2001). 
 174. Id. at 462. 
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A clear example of this dynamic is demonstrated by Boltanski 
and Chiapello in their book The new spirit of capitalism. “When capi-
talism is forced to respond to the problematic points alluded to by 
critics, it agrees with it to preserve the support of its troops who want 
to give credit to the accusations, then it upends a part of the values 
for which it was criticized.”176  The dynamic effect of the criticism to 
the spirit of capitalism takes place in such a fashion as to strengthen 
its models of justification and the structures connected to it.  Without 
in fact questioning the principle of accumulation or that of obligatory 
profits, the criticism is partially successful. It is through this process, 
which integrates within capitalism directives that correspond to those 
problematic points considered most inopportune by its critics.”177  
Thus, in response to criticisms unleashed at the start of the 1960’s 
against the capitalist model, the economy responded with support to 
mobility, teamwork, individual responsibility, and human re-
sources.178  
Additionally, important responsibilities were transferred by the 
State to private enterprise.179 This transfer of responsibility was ini-
tially understood as freedom resulting from the entrepreneur’s right 
to free enterprise; however, today it is perceived to mean an extra 
burden on the individual. The alterations in our time motivated by the 
incorporation of criticism to capitalism have led to a serious increase 
in temporary employment contracts, which cause much of the active 
population to live an absolutely frightening and exhausting life.180  
Moreover, other social sub-systems incorporating into their pro-
gramming the economic rational start to run with the same rules as 
the economic system.  
For example, in religious systems, one is currently able to find 
that believers are again being encouraged to provide material proof of 
their faith, i.e. through financial support, political engagement, or by 
becoming martyrs.181 As such, the individual, as a person in society, 
accepts in consideration for the freedom earned, at all times, this new 
 
 176. Infra note 178.   
 177. LUC BOLTANSKI & EVE CHIAPELLO, THE NEW SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 70 (Gregory El-
liott trans., Verso 2005). 
 178. Id. at 69.  
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and additional responsibility, which previously belonged to the State, 
the church, the economy, the healthcare system, etc.  An individual 
suffocated by this type of freedom is much more likely to suffer from 
psychological illnesses than before.182  Depression is an “illness of re-
sponsibility,” whereby feelings of inferiority are predominant.  A de-
pressed person is never at their maximum capacity.  They are ex-
hausted by the effort of trying to be themselves.183  
 The line of reasoning set out in this article had the goal of 
demonstrating that an autonomous individual in the current societal 
environment is strongly irritated, influenced, and manipulated by var-
ious rationales of communication, which are generated by varying 
social systems and sub-systems, especially the economic system and 
sub-systems and regimes connected thereto.  At times the manipula-
tion passes unperceived; at others, without the power to react, the in-
dividually is strongly psychologically affected, which contributes on 
a larger scale towards psychological illnesses such as depression, 
panic attacks and uncontrollable fears.184  This is why the function of 
fundamental rights is stressed as being essential for allowing individ-
uals to reflect upon their own rights, and outside of society, to define 
their internal freedom for themselves.   
Self-determination of internal freedom – for example, the free 
exercise of faith or conscience, not just through these constitutional 
guarantees, but also other guarantees of freedom for the individual – 
enables individuals to differentiate themselves in their social role.  
With this, they may determine the frontiers of their environment, thus 
allowing them to be capable of understanding the psychological bur-
dens of modern society, seeking the assistance that they need or 






 182. EHRENBERG, supra note 177, at 28. 
 183. EHRENBERG, supra note 177, at 4. 
 184. HONNETH, supra note 112, at 156. 
